Here are several research papers recently published in top academic journals from across our departments:
John Donovan, Assistant Professor of Accountancy
"Private Lenders’ Use of Analyst Earnings Forecasts When Establishing Debt Covenant Thresholds" (The Accounting Review)
We provide evidence that lenders use analyst forecasts of the borrower’s future earnings as an input when establishing covenant thresholds in private debt contracts. Our evidence is contrary to the view that covenant thresholds are set based on a minimum level of expected performance. Our study also contributes to the literature on the role of analysts in informing market participants and suggests that analysts also provide information to lenders with access to private information.
"Private Lenders’ Use of Analyst Earnings Forecasts When Establishing Debt Covenant Thresholds" (The Accounting Review)
We provide evidence that lenders use analyst forecasts of the borrower’s future earnings as an input when establishing covenant thresholds in private debt contracts. Our evidence is contrary to the view that covenant thresholds are set based on a minimum level of expected performance. Our study also contributes to the literature on the role of analysts in informing market participants and suggests that analysts also provide information to lenders with access to private information.
Tim Kundro, Assistant Professor of Management & Organization
“Understanding When and Why Cover-Ups Are Punished Less Severely” (Academy of Management Journal)
Cover-ups are remarkably costly, often immoral, and problematic for organizations, but research paints competing perspectives about how organizational insiders respond to cover-ups. We explore why organizational insiders punish or fail to punish transgressors. We find that cover-ups that are perceived as loyal go unpunished, suggesting that loyalty comes with costs in this context.
“Understanding When and Why Cover-Ups Are Punished Less Severely” (Academy of Management Journal)
Cover-ups are remarkably costly, often immoral, and problematic for organizations, but research paints competing perspectives about how organizational insiders respond to cover-ups. We explore why organizational insiders punish or fail to punish transgressors. We find that cover-ups that are perceived as loyal go unpunished, suggesting that loyalty comes with costs in this context.
John Sherry, Raymond W. & Kenneth G. Herrick Professor of Marketing Emeritus
"Attachment to and Detachment from Favorite Stores: An Affordance Theory Perspective" (Journal of Consumer Research)
Retail locations offer opportunities for attachment away from home. In commercial settings, consumers construct personal geographies, creating stable references for their lives. We show how sensual, symbolic, and cerebral affordances – invitations for action extended by the built environment - trigger meaningful ties, stimulate new affective and behavioral repertoires, and transform biographies. Bonds evolve over life courses and are affected by disturbances such as store closures. We reveal how disruptive and tractable detachments precipitate constructive change.
"Attachment to and Detachment from Favorite Stores: An Affordance Theory Perspective" (Journal of Consumer Research)
Retail locations offer opportunities for attachment away from home. In commercial settings, consumers construct personal geographies, creating stable references for their lives. We show how sensual, symbolic, and cerebral affordances – invitations for action extended by the built environment - trigger meaningful ties, stimulate new affective and behavioral repertoires, and transform biographies. Bonds evolve over life courses and are affected by disturbances such as store closures. We reveal how disruptive and tractable detachments precipitate constructive change.
Sriram Somanchi, Assistant Professor of IT, Analytics, and Operations
"To Predict or Not to Predict: The Case of the Emergency Department" (Production and Operations Management Journal)
We develop a novel two-stage prediction framework that improves the efficiency of hospital operations in terms of handoff from an Emergency Department (ED) to an inpatient facility. Working with a healthcare startup, we show that our method identifies subgroups of patients for whom we can send early signals to an inpatient facility about an admitting patient with limited information while still maintaining high accuracy. Our work has significant potential value to healthcare entities and contributes to a growing stream of work on how to best realize the value of healthcare analytics efforts.
"To Predict or Not to Predict: The Case of the Emergency Department" (Production and Operations Management Journal)
We develop a novel two-stage prediction framework that improves the efficiency of hospital operations in terms of handoff from an Emergency Department (ED) to an inpatient facility. Working with a healthcare startup, we show that our method identifies subgroups of patients for whom we can send early signals to an inpatient facility about an admitting patient with limited information while still maintaining high accuracy. Our work has significant potential value to healthcare entities and contributes to a growing stream of work on how to best realize the value of healthcare analytics efforts.
Rafael Zambrana, Assistant Professor of Finance
"A Tale of Two Types: Generalists vs. Specialists in Asset Management" (Journal of Financial Economics)
We study the allocation of human capital within management companies and analyze whether there is an optimal assignment of portfolio managers based on their investment strategy. We find that management companies achieve higher performance by assigning stock pickers to manage funds within a single investment objective (specialists) and market timers to run multiple funds with different investment objectives (generalists). Overall, our results are consistent with decision-making in management companies that add value to their investors by aiming to optimally assign portfolio managers.
"A Tale of Two Types: Generalists vs. Specialists in Asset Management" (Journal of Financial Economics)
We study the allocation of human capital within management companies and analyze whether there is an optimal assignment of portfolio managers based on their investment strategy. We find that management companies achieve higher performance by assigning stock pickers to manage funds within a single investment objective (specialists) and market timers to run multiple funds with different investment objectives (generalists). Overall, our results are consistent with decision-making in management companies that add value to their investors by aiming to optimally assign portfolio managers.
My thanks to these faculty members and the many others whose efforts contribute new knowledge to their disciplines and who “grow the good in business” through their research.
In Notre Dame,
Martijn
